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THE FAMILY’S CONSTITUTION
Douglas NeJaime*
Many of the leading constitutional issues of our day implicate
family law matters.1 Modern substantive due process is replete
with questions of family law. Griswold v. Connecticut,2 Eisenstadt
v. Baird,3 Roe v. Wade,4 Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 and
Lawrence v. Texas6 raise issues of family formation, intimate
relationships, and reproductive decision making. Loving v.
Virginia,7 Zablocki v. Redhail,8 and Turner v. Safley9 address the
contours of marriage. Moore v. City of East Cleveland10 protects
the extended family. Stanley v. Illinois,11 Lehr v. Robertson,12 and
Michael H. v. Gerald D.13 consider the rights of unmarried fathers.
Troxel v. Granville14 protects a parent’s childrearing decisions.
Modern equal protection law, too, features a significant number
of family law issues. A string of cases beginning in the late 1960s
extends rights to nonmarital parent-child relationships.15 Leading
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School (beginning July 1, 2017); Visiting Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School (Spring 2017); Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law
(through June 30, 2017); Faculty Director, The Williams Institute. I am grateful to Jill
Hasday for including me in this symposium on family law and constitutional law and for
providing helpful feedback on an earlier draft. Kerry Abrams and Melissa Murray also
provided thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. For excellent research assistance, I thank
Sanya Kumar and the law librarians at Harvard Law School.
1. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 40 (2014); David D.
Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 571 (2008).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
9. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
10. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
11. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
13. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
14. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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sex equality decisions dating back to the 1970s render rights and
responsibilities regarding marriage and childrearing formally
gender neutral.16 Most recently, decisions on the rights of samesex couples to marry—namely, United States v. Windsor17 and
Obergefell v. Hodges18—recognize the families formed by gays
and lesbians on grounds of equal protection and due process.
These cases are thought to represent a relatively
straightforward account of the relationship between family law
and constitutional law.19 On this account, family law is generally
perceived as a body of state law.20 Legislatures pass statutes that
define and regulate relationships between adults as well as
parents and children.21 Courts resolve specific disputes by
interpreting and applying these statutes, as well as through
common law and equitable principles that have traditionally
governed family law. (In resolving questions of family law, state
courts seldom turn to constitutional doctrine—whether state or
federal.22) Through this lens, domestic relations implicate matters
of local concern; federal courts give states wide latitude to
regulate the family, and thus only rarely do family law questions
enter federal courts.23 When they do, courts attempt to leave
16. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ( 1975).
17. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
19. In this Article, I am primarily concerned with federal, not state, constitutional
law. To be sure, there is an extensive body of state constitutional law on questions of family
rights and recognition. The relationship between state constitutional resolution of family
law questions and subsequent federal constitutional resolution of similar questions is
worthy of its own scholarly treatment.
20. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“[T]here is no federal law
of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.”).
21. This emphasis also ties to family law’s scope, which rests on the continued
influence of the family/market distinction. For a brilliant genealogical account of how
family law came to be preoccupied with “the formation of [marital and parental]
relationships,” rather than with “distributional consequences,” see Janet Halley, What Is
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5–6 (2011); see also Janet
Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189 (2011).
22. Of course, courts avoid constitutional questions as a general matter when cases
can be resolved on other grounds. On the justifications for and criticisms of the avoidance
canon, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 184–89.
23. See, for instance, the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582 (1859). For an insightful analysis and critique, see Naomi R. Cahn, Family
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994). On some of the
historical and intellectual foundations of family law’s local character, see Halley, What Is
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, supra note 21, at 48–52 (tracing how the notion of
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ample room for state regulation.24 Nonetheless, federal courts
may eventually apply federal constitutional law in ways that
invalidate forms of family regulation in many states.25 On this
view, constitutional principles—primarily equal protection and
due process—operate to discipline and reorient state family law,
and family law responds by reforming itself in line with
constitutional mandates.26
This conventional account is inaccurate along a number of
dimensions, some of which family law scholars have explored.27 I
focus here on how this account distorts the interaction between
family law and constitutional law. On the conventional
understanding, family law and constitutional law exist in relatively
separate spheres,28 but occasionally meet when constitutional law,
exercising power in a top-down way, dictates new directions for
family regulation.29 This account fails to capture the dialogic
relationship between family law and constitutional law. It fails to
see that family law and constitutional law often occupy the same
marriage as status, and relatedly as outside the scope of the federal Constitution’s
Contracts Clause, enabled deference to local control over marriage and divorce).
24. In Troxel, for instance, the Court struck down the Washington third-party
visitation statute only as applied to the case before it, thus leaving to the states resolution
of the contours of custody and visitation. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). In
Troxel’s wake, statutory reform and litigation at the state level over grandparent visitation
proliferated.
25. For instance, when the Court protected the rights of unmarried fathers as a
matter of due process and the rights of nonmarital children as a matter of equal protection,
it pushed states to significantly reform their approaches to parent-child relationships.
26. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1159 (1980) (“Government policy toward the family has traditionally been
regarded as presenting local rather than national questions. . . . But the states’ power to
legislate and administer family law has never been exempt from constitutional limitations.
Restricting state power within constitutional bounds is an appropriate task for the federal
judiciary, and carrying out this duty ‘does not make of [the Supreme] Court a court of
probate and divorce.’ The Court has properly insisted that state intervention respect
fundamental human rights.”) (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233
(1945)).
27. For example, Jill Hasday has extensively and persuasively shown the
pervasiveness of federal family law. See HASDAY, supra note 1, at 17–66.
28. I use the term “separate spheres” deliberately, given that family law’s localism
historically served to authorize and insulate a gender-hierarchical system. See Judith
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2199 (1993); Emily
J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 468 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, She
The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 948, 1036 (2002).
29. But see Meyer, supra note 1, at 568–69 (arguing that more recent constitutional
adjudication in family law conflicts reflects a more restrained approach, essentially
“pushing the courts to balance the contending interests more evenly case-by-case”).
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space, contribute to understandings of the same issues, and
interact in mutually constitutive ways. Further, the conventional
account fails to appreciate the ways in which family law exerts
influence over constitutional law; family law shapes the terrain on
which constitutional adjudication occurs, structures constitutional
conflict, and orients constitutional reasoning.
To many scholars of family law, this claim may seem obvious.
Indeed, there is a rich family law literature challenging the
conventional narrative that family law and federal law are, and
should be, separate. Scholars have shown that, contrary to
common assumptions, family law is not simply a matter of local
control and is not outside the scope of federal oversight.30 Rather,
specific bodies of federal law should be considered family law. By
including constitutional oversight as a component of federal
family law,31 this literature convincingly challenges the instinct of
courts and commentators to view (state) family law and (federal)
constitutional law as distinct.
Nonetheless, this body of scholarship is more concerned with
federalism, and thus levels of government rather than bodies of
law. In contrast, this Article’s central concern relates to doctrinal,
rather than governmental, boundaries. In particular, it focuses on
family law—and specifically a body of case law and statutes
regulating family relationships—and constitutional law—and
primarily questions of equality and liberty. Indeed, while my
analysis draws on the interaction between regulation of the family
and federal constitutional law, similar observations may be made
about family law and state constitutional decisions.
Even as this Article attends to a dynamic that has yet to be
explicitly elaborated, it joins existing family law scholarship that
challenges conventional narratives about family law’s place in the
legal order. My claim about the dialogic relationship between
family law and constitutional law runs against tendencies that
continue to dominate the treatment of family law and
constitutional law.32 Identifying and unpacking this dialogic
30. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1297 (1997); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787
(2015); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 (2000).
31. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870–83
(2004); Joslin, supra note 30, at 787.
32. See HASDAY, supra note 1, at 222 (noting the failure “to understand family law’s
relationship to the rest of the law”); Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its
Relationship to Family Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 197, 206–07 (2017).
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relationship is critical to appreciating the reach of family law, as
well as the role of constitutional review in regulation of the
family.33 It suggests that, with respect to divisive conflicts over the
family, existing accounts both underestimate the power of state
family law developments and overestimate the power of federal
courts applying federal constitutional law.
This Article captures the dialogic relationship between
family law and constitutional law by drawing on my earlier work
on the relationship between LGBT legal mobilization and the
resolution of claims to marital and parental recognition.34
Marriage and parenthood are central institutions in family law
and receive protection as a matter of constitutional law.
Contestation in family law over the meaning of marriage and
parenthood has shaped understandings of these institutions for
purposes of constitutional doctrine. And constitutional doctrine
has in turn shaped family law disputes over the contours of marital
and parental recognition.
First, this Article examines family law reform aimed at
nonmarital relationship and parental recognition for gays and
lesbians. These family law developments contributed to new
understandings of marriage and parenthood, as well as same-sex
couples’ status within each. Constitutional claims to marriage
equality gained traction after family law work altered the meaning
and reach of marriage and parenthood, and positioned same-sexcouple-headed families as similarly situated to different-sexcouple-headed families for purposes of relationship and parental
recognition.
Accordingly, this Article then relates earlier family law
reform to eventual constitutional adjudication of same-sex
couples’ claims to marry. Federal courts considered whether
same-sex couples merited inclusion in marriage in ways that were
shaped by family law struggles over the romantic and parental
relationships of gays and lesbians. Meanings forged in family law
conflict structured how federal courts understood the purposes
33. Professor Courtney Joslin makes this point in responding to my work on the
relationship between parentage law and marriage equality, noting that Marriage Equality
and the New Parenthood “reminds us of some of the critical legal insights that can be lost
when we fail to see legal questions as family law questions or through the lens of the
family.” See Joslin, supra note 32, at 207.
34. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185 (2016); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014).
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and boundaries of marriage and parenthood as a matter of
constitutional doctrine.
Appreciating the historical trajectory of same-sex
marriage—and specifically situating same-sex marriage within
broader conflicts over the family—enables us to see how marriage
equality relates to a more capacious set of questions about family
formation and recognition that lawmakers and judges will
continue to confront.35 After exploring the impact of family law
developments on constitutional decisions, this Article returns to
family law. Rather than resolve family law questions,
constitutional adjudication reshapes aspects of state family law,
not only in a clear top-down manner but in more subtle ways. The
inclusion of same-sex couples in marriage altered the meaning of
marital parenthood by mainstreaming concepts of intentional and
functional parenthood while rendering biological and gendered
approaches to parenthood less dominant. With such inclusion
occurring on constitutional terms, advocates for parental
recognition have gained new and powerful arguments for reform
of parentage law. Understanding marriage equality’s family law
antecedents relates the constitutional embrace of same-sex
marriage to parental recognition, making visible parenthood’s
centrality to the equal status of gays and lesbians.
Finally, this Article briefly contemplates the future
interaction between family law and constitutional law, specifically
with respect to parenthood. In the wake of marriage equality,
shifts in the law of parental recognition have been expressed in
constitutional terms. For married lesbian couples, constitutional
protection for the nonbiological mother’s parent-child
relationship has generally sounded in the register of equality. Due
process protection for parental rights, in contrast, remains
tethered to the biological connection between parent and child,
even as family law has increasingly embraced concepts of
parenthood that transcend biological relationships. Accordingly,
this Article briefly contemplates how, if at all, family law shifts in

35. This perspective resonates with Reva Siegel’s approach to reading the
constitutional guarantees of sex equality in light of struggles over women’s suffrage that
culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment and its repudiation of gender-based family roles
that facilitated and justified women’s exclusion from full democratic citizenship. See Siegel,
supra note 28. Siegel’s work illustrates the importance of orienting constitutional sex
equality to earlier conflicts over the family.
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the meaning of parenthood might reverberate in constitutional
conflict over parental rights.
The examples of the dialogic relationship between family law
and constitutional law presented here are meant to be illustrative
and not exhaustive. They are limited to one context—LGBT
family recognition—and focus on developments from a single
jurisdiction—California. This Article’s larger purpose is to initiate
a dialogue about family law and constitutional law—to challenge
the conventional divide between family law and constitutional
law, to open up questions about the concrete interaction between
the two, and to begin the work of theorizing the relationship
between them. In that spirit, this Article concludes by briefly
suggesting how the account of family law and constitutional law
articulated here might shed light on debates regarding law and
social change.
I. FAMILY LAW’S CONSTITUTIVE ROLE
This Part shows how the development of state family law
both relied on constitutional equality commitments and in turn
contributed to evolving understandings of those commitments.
Beginning in the 1980s, as both the HIV/AIDS crisis and the
lesbian baby boom began, LGBT advocates fought for the rights
of families created by gays and lesbians. Claims to family
recognition are evident in both statutory reform and litigation,
and these claims are observable in work relating to both adult
relationship recognition and parental recognition. Advocates
portrayed same-sex-couple-headed families as like different-sexcouple-headed families, and framed the extension of nonmarital
rights and recognition to same-sex couples as an equality measure.
The specific ways in which same-sex-couple-headed families were
painted as like different-sex-couple-headed families contributed
to understandings of marriage and parenthood that would
ultimately shape constitutional approaches to same-sex marriage.
A. RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION: ARTICULATING
EQUALITY AND APPROXIMATING MARRIAGE
With same-sex couples excluded from marriage, LGBT
activists engineered the concept of domestic partnership as a
partial remedy for the discrimination faced by gays and lesbians.
Same-sex couples were depicted by advocates as like different-sex
couples, even though they were excluded from marriage. Through
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this lens, same-sex couples lived marriage-like lives, and thus their
claims to nonmarital recognition sounded in equality. Because
domestic partnership represented, at least in part, a response to
same-sex couples’ exclusion from marriage, and because LGBT
advocates needed to persuade others who prioritized marriage as
a model of family recognition, it made sense to approach domestic
partnership as approximating the qualities of marriage and
accommodating marriage-like relationships.36
Efforts to achieve domestic partnership at the local level
leveraged newly won antidiscrimination mandates. In 1978, both
San Francisco and Berkeley enacted ordinances that prohibited
sexual orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations.37 The following year, in response to
Berkeley’s ordinance, a leading LGBT activist urged the city to
provide healthcare coverage to same-sex partners of municipal
employees.38 It was unfair, he argued, to use marriage as the sole
eligibility criterion for benefits, and so suggested that the city
create a “domestic partnership” designation to repair the
problem.39 In nearby San Francisco, an openly gay elected official
also proposed a domestic partnership system in the wake of sexual
orientation nondiscrimination protections.40
Even as early domestic partnership proposals included both
same-sex and different-sex couples, LGBT advocates drew
distinctions between the two in ways that emphasized the harms
that same-sex couples in particular experienced as a result of their
exclusion from marriage. In San Francisco, for instance, activists
noted that different-sex couples’ “temporary, voluntary exclusion
when they do not choose to marry is not equal to [same-sex

36. The brief account presented here draws on my comprehensive examination of
the history of nonmarital relationship recognition in California. See NeJaime, Before
Marriage, supra note 34. While the examples are taken from that article, I provide citations
here to the primary sources.
37. Les Ledbetter, Bill on Homosexual Rights Advances in San Francisco, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1978, at A21; Berkeley City Code §13.28.010 et seq. See also Berkeley
Council Approves Strong Gay Rights Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1978, at B28.
38. See Leland Traiman, A Brief History of Domestic Partnerships, 15 GAY &
LESBIAN REV. 23, 23 (2008).
39. See id.
40. See Wallace Turner, Couple Law Asked for San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1982, at A1; An Ordinance To Create a Record of Domestic Partnerships, Draft at 1 (1982)
(from the files of Matt Coles) (on file with author).
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couples’] permanent, involuntary, and categorical exclusion.”41 On
this view, the domestic partnership policy was critical not simply
to extend benefits to more relationships but rather to partially
compensate for the unequal treatment of same-sex couples vis-àvis marriage.
While San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein vetoed the
ordinance passed by the Board of Supervisors,42 lesbian and gay
activists in Berkeley took their grievances to the city’s Human
Relations and Welfare Commission (HRWC). They argued that
the use of marriage as the eligibility criterion for employee
benefits “has a discriminatory effect against lesbians and gay
men.”43 When HRWC later held hearings on the issue, LGBT
activists expressed support for a domestic partnership policy as a
remedy to “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”44
Same-sex couples, they demanded, should “receive [their] fair
share and not be excluded from ‘spousal benefits.’”45 Importantly,
the domestic partnership demand did not explicitly challenge the
link between marriage and family-based benefits, but instead
suggested that same-sex couples deserved those benefits and yet
were ineligible to marry.
When HRWC later recommended that the city adopt a
domestic partnership policy,46 it focused on how exclusionary
marriage laws specifically injured same-sex couples: “All
unmarried opposite-gender couples are able to move voluntarily
across the ‘marriage barrier,’” but “[a]ll same-gender couples are
unable to move across the ‘marriage barrier’—forever and
regardless of their will.”47 In this way, HRWC framed a domestic
partnership policy that would ultimately cover both same-sex and
different-sex couples primarily as an equality measure for samesex couples. Indeed, HRWC did not purport to seek a “generally
better” system of benefits distribution, but, given that it was
responding “to a particular set of complaints” from “members of
41. Points To Remember When Countering Opposition or Criticism, in personal
notes of Matt Coles (1982) (on file with author).
42. David Morris, SF Mayor Vetoes Domestic Partners Bill, 10 GAY COMM’Y NEWS
1 (1982).
43. Memorandum from Human Relations and Welfare Commission, to Hon. Mayor
and Members of the City Council 1 (July 17, 1984) (on file with author).
44. Id. at 4–6.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 20.
47. Id. at 9.
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the lesbian/gay community,” sought “to make the benefits
program specifically more equal.”48
In staking out the equal status of same-sex couples (ineligible
to marry) with respect to different-sex couples (eligible to marry),
HRWC urged a domestic partnership regime that
“approximate[d] the current marriage criterion.”49 Domestic
partnership, it recommended, should be defined to include two
people “not related by blood closer than would bar marriage”
who “reside[] together and share the common necessities of life”
and are “responsible for [each other’s] common welfare.”50 This
policy mirrored the earlier San Francisco proposal, which defined
domestic partners as “[t]wo individuals”:
(a) “not related by blood,”
(b) “[n]either is married, nor are they related by
marriage,”
(c) who “share the common necessaries of life,”
(d) “declare that they are each other’s principal domestic
partner,” and
(e) “[n]either has, within the last six months[,] declared
to any City department that he or she has a different
domestic partner.”51
While efforts in San Francisco at that point had failed, Berkeley
officials adopted HRWC’s proposed domestic partnership policy
in 1984. Framed as an equality measure for same-sex couples, the
policy nonetheless applied to unmarried city employees in either
a same-sex or different-sex relationship.
As the efforts from Berkeley and San Francisco illustrate, the
earliest domestic partnership protections were framed in large
part as sexual orientation equality measures, even when they
included different-sex couples otherwise eligible to marry. The
government extended family-based protections to same-sex
couples as a partial remedy for lesbian and gay exclusion from
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Domestic Partnerships, Amending San Francisco Administrative Code by
Adding Chapter 45 Thereto, Establishing Domestic Partnerships and Requiring Boards,
Commissions and Departments of the City and County of San Francisco To Afford to
Domestic Partners the Same Rights and Privileges as Spouses at 1 (1982) (on file with
author).
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marriage. Because same-sex couples acted like married couples,
LGBT advocates suggested, they merited recognition that
approximated marriage.
In articulating the ways in which same-sex couples were like
married couples, LGBT activists also articulated shared
understandings of marriage. Advocates’ sameness arguments did
not simply assimilate gays and lesbians to dominant norms and
shore up the centrality of marriage. Instead, with same-sex
couples in view, marriage’s focus shifted from gender
differentiation and procreation to romantic affiliation and
financial and emotional interdependence. In portraying same-sex
couples as marriage-like to secure nonmarital recognition, LGBT
activists contributed to an understanding of same-sex couples as
deserving of marriage and an understanding of marriage as
consistent with same-sex-couple-headed families.
B. PARENTAL RECOGNITION: SHIFTING MEANINGS OF
PARENTHOOD AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION EQUALITY
Just as LGBT advocates worked in the space outside
marriage to both stake out the equal status of same-sex
relationships and secure rights for same-sex couples, they also
worked in the space outside marriage to assert claims to family
equality and attain parental recognition for same-sex parents.52
Claims to parental recognition under the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) illustrate.
The 1973 UPA, which provided a statutory scheme to
recognize parent-child relationships, followed constitutional
decisions rejecting discrimination against nonmarital children and
recognizing the parental rights of unmarried fathers.53 Many
states, including California, adopted the UPA with modifications.
While the UPA clearly did not contemplate the families formed
by same-sex couples, by the late 1990s, LGBT advocates in
California began to assert claims to parental recognition under
the UPA.54

52. Again, the brief account presented here draws on my comprehensive
examination of the history of nonmarital parental recognition in California. See NeJaime,
Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34. While the examples are taken
from that article, I provide citations here to the primary sources.
53. See id. at 1194–95.
54. See id. at 1212–29.
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For marital families, legislatures adopting the UPA, and
courts applying its provisions, had increasingly used concepts of
intent and function to protect parent-child relationships, often for
parents who lacked biological ties to their children.55 The UPA
regulated donor insemination by providing that the husband of a
woman who gives birth to a child conceived with donor sperm
shall “be treated in law as if he were the natural father.”56
Marriage to the mother provided evidence of his intent to parent.
Principles of intent eventually began to shape determinations
of motherhood as well. In Johnson v. Calvert, a case involving
gestational surrogacy, the California Supreme Court applied the
UPA to recognize the intended mother and her husband, who
were also the child’s genetic parents, as the child’s legal parents—
over the objection of the gestational surrogate.57 Later, the
California Court of Appeal extended the logic of both Johnson
and the donor-insemination statute to a woman who had neither
a gestational nor genetic connection to her child. In Marriage of
Buzzanca, the court recognized as parents a divorcing husband
and wife who had engaged a gestational surrogate to carry a child
conceived with donor egg and sperm.58 Guided by the UPA’s
regulation of donor insemination, the court recognized the
married parents based not on biological connections but on
intentional relationships.
To leverage these developments in ways that reached samesex couples, who were still excluded from marriage, LGBT
advocates argued that recognition of nonbiological parents should
extend to nonmarital families. To do so, they portrayed same-sex
couples’ nonmarital families as sufficiently marriage-like to merit
similar forms of parental recognition, even as they argued against
marriage as a dividing line for parentage.
Consider an early, important victory before the California
Board of Equalization—an unlikely venue for family law reform.59
Helmi Hisserich claimed as her dependent the child whom she
and her registered domestic partner, Tori Patterson, were raising.
Lawyers at the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR)
argued that Hisserich, the nonbiological parent, was the parent
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1195–96, 1208–12.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Hisserich, Case No. 99A-0341, 2000 WL 1880484 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000).
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based on the “doctrine of intentional parenthood” embraced in
Johnson and Buzzanca.60 In its 2000 decision, the Board of
Equalization accepted this argument:
Appellant and her domestic partner, unable to marry under
California law, registered as domestic partners with the city,
county, and state in which they lived; they maintained a
committed relationship for a substantial period of time prior to
the decision to have a child; they decided to have a child
together with the specific intent to rear the child together; they
voluntarily and knowingly consented to the artificial
insemination of Ms. Patterson with a licensed California sperm
bank under the direction of a licensed California physician;
appellant further exhibited her intent to be Madeline’s parent
by initiating adoption proceedings following Madeline’s birth;
and they lived together, conducted themselves, and held
themselves out to the community as a family following the birth
of Madeline.61

The relationship between Hisserich and Patterson, which as
a strictly legal matter was irrelevant to the parent-child
relationship, furnished evidence of the couple’s intent to coparent. Moreover, the fact that Hisserich and Patterson were
“unable to marry under California law” appeared relevant to the
Board’s approach to their family. Their marriage-like but legally
nonmarital relationship, as well as their joint decision to have and
raise a child within that relationship, brought them within the
intent-based concepts articulated in Johnson and Buzzanca,
which had involved married couples. Indeed, the board deemed it
“essential to [its] conclusion that appellant and Ms. Patterson . . .
are an unmarried couple who maintained a committed
relationship[.]”62 In depicting Hisserich and Patterson as
sufficiently marriage-like to merit treatment analogous to married
parents, the Board advanced, at least implicitly, a particular view
of marriage, and marital parenting specifically; married couples,
just like Hisserich and Patterson, formed intimate, committed
relationships and then jointly decided to bring children into their
families and to raise those children together. Biological
procreation and gender-differentiated parenting seemed
immaterial to this model of marital parenting.

60.
61.
62.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
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By 2005, the California Supreme Court took up the question
of recognition of nonbiological lesbian co-parents. By that point,
not only had the California courts and legislature recognized
nonbiological parents in the context of marriage, but they had also
recognized nonbiological mothers and fathers outside of
marriage.63 The UPA provided that a man who “receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”
is presumed to be the child’s legal father.64 In its 2002 Nicholas H.
decision, the California Supreme Court held that an unmarried
father could hold a child out as his “natural” child, and thus satisfy
the relevant presumption of paternity, even if he acknowledged
from the start that the child was not his biological child.65 Soon
after Nicholas H., the California Court of Appeal, in Karen C.,
recognized a woman as a mother even though she was not the
child’s biological mother, based on the fact that she held the child
out as her own.66 The case, which arose outside the context of
same-sex parenting, tested the reach of the UPA’s genderneutrality directive, which provided that “[i]nsofar as practicable,
the provisions . . . applicable to the father and child relationship
apply” to the mother and child relationship.67
The recognition of nonbiological parents in same-sex couples
now posed a question of equality. Of course, nonrecognition of
same-sex parents undermined key objectives of the family law
system; government officials eager to privatize dependency
sought to find parents who could provide not only emotional but
financial support to children.68 But nonrecognition of same-sex
parents also conflicted with emergent equality principles. If other
nonbiological parents, including both women and men in both
marital and nonmarital families, obtained legal recognition, the
exclusion of same-sex-couple-headed families appeared not only
unfair but unconstitutional.
In Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, the
nonbiological lesbian co-parent, Elisa, sought to avoid parental

63.

See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1216–

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
(2015).

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
In re Nicholas H., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. 2002).
In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
See Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2008–09

18.
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obligations to children born to her partner, Emily.69 Representing
Emily, the biological mother asserting that her former partner was
also a legal parent, lawyers at NCLR emphasized the equality
commitments animating the UPA and linked those commitments
to constitutional principles. Refusing to find Elisa to be a legal
parent, they argued, “is inconsistent with the UPA’s goal of
providing equality for nonmarital children and with the equal
protection guarantees of the California and federal
constitutions.”70 The claim to parental recognition now
constituted a claim to equality, articulated in terms of not only
family law but also constitutional law:
[U]nder any form of equal protection analysis, an
interpretation of California’s parentage laws that denies legal
recognition of Elisa’s and Ry and Kaia’s parent-child
relationships would be unconstitutional. It is patently irrational
to recognize as legal parents: (1) a wife who consents to the
insemination of a gestational surrogate by her husband, as in
Johnson; (2) a wife and a husband who consent to the
insemination of a gestational surrogate using a donated egg and
donated sperm, as in Buzzanca; (3) a man who holds himself
out as a child’s father, but is neither married to the child’s
mother nor biologically related to child, as in Nicholas H.; and
(4) a woman who holds herself out as a child’s mother, but is
neither married to the child’s father nor biologically related to
the child, as in Karen C., but to deny legal parentage to a
lesbian who consented to her partner’s artificial insemination
with the intention of parenting the resulting children and who
subsequently assumed parental responsibility for the children
and held herself out as their parent to the world.71

Constitutional equality principles, the attorneys argued, should
animate interpretation and application of the UPA in light of a
string of family law decisions extending parental recognition on
grounds of intent and function.

69. Consolidated Answer Brief on the Merits, Elisa B. v. Super. Ct. of El Dorado
Cty., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). Elisa and Emily had three children together; Elisa was the
biological mother of one, and Emily was the biological mother of the other two. The
women were raising all three children together as their children. After the relationship
dissolved, Elisa disclaimed any responsibility for the two children biologically related to
Emily, seeking to preserve only her relationship to the child to whom she was biologically
related.
70. Opening Brief of Real Party in Interest Emily B., at 14, Elisa B. v. El Dorado
Cty. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
71. Id. at 38.
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The marriage-like family formation of Elisa and Emily
buttressed the equality claim to parental recognition. If Elisa and
Emily, excluded from marriage, acted like married couples who
form families with children, denying legal recognition to their
parental relationships seemed not only unfair but illogical.
Accordingly, NCLR lawyers drew attention to the planned,
functional family formed by Elisa and Emily. The opening
paragraph of facts explained: “Elisa and Emily were in a
committed relationship for more than six years. They had a
commitment ceremony, exchanged rings, and pooled their
finances. In 1995, Elisa and Emily decided to have children
together.”72 Like Hisserich and Patterson in NCLR’s earlier case,
Elisa and Emily had a marriage-like relationship. They evidenced
emotional and economic interdependence in ways that recalled
the framing of same-sex relationships in earlier domestic
partnership efforts. Their decision to have children followed from
their creation of a marriage-like family unit, which itself provided
evidence of their intent to parent together and demonstrated
parental conduct. Again, on this view, marriage featured
committed intimate relationships and joint efforts to have and
raise children; sexual procreation, gender differentiation, and
biological parenting had fallen out of view.
The California Supreme Court, relying heavily on Nicholas
H., recognized Elisa, the nonbiological co-parent, as a legal parent
under the UPA’s “holding out” provision.73 Appealing to central
concerns of family law—”the state’s interest in the welfare of the
child and the integrity of the family”74—the court embraced a
notion of social, rather than biological, parenthood for both
different-sex and same-sex parenting in both marital and
nonmarital contexts. Even though the constitutional claims that
NCLR pressed in making the case for recognition did not feature
in the decision itself, the result furthered commitments to equality
by affording recognition to parents in same-sex couples. Same-sex
couples had been deemed appropriate subjects for parental
recognition, even as they remained excluded from marriage.
Over the course of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, family law work by LGBT advocates had accomplished
much. Even as recognition of the romantic and parental bonds
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 7.
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 668.
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formed by gays and lesbians advanced family law priorities, such
as privatizing dependency and promoting children’s welfare, such
recognition also staked out the family as a critical site of LGBT
equality. Furthermore, it set up claims to marital recognition by,
on one hand, framing same-sex couples as sufficiently marriagelike to merit inclusion and, on the other hand, contributing to
understandings of marriage that mapped onto the lives of samesex couples. In this sense, LGBT advocacy was driven by
assimilationist impulses and, at the same time, more
transformative instincts. In fact, as I show in other work,
assimilationist claims—that is, that same-sex couples are like
married different-sex couples—subtly forced law to reckon with
and accommodate distinctive features of families formed by samesex couples.75
II. CONSTITUTING MARRIAGE
This Part turns to the acceptance of same-sex couples’ claims
to marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law. It shows how
family law developments relating to nonmarital rights and
recognition structured understandings of the connection between
constitutionally protected liberties—like marriage and
parenthood—and sexual orientation equality. If marriage were
defined by mutual commitment, romantic affiliation, and
emotional and economic interdependence, same-sex couples
could make persuasive claims to inclusion. If marital parenting
were defined by intentional and functional parent-child bonds,
rather than by biological procreation and gender-differentiated
parenting, same-sex couples could convincingly argue for
inclusion.
A. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Claims to marriage equality both predated and followed from
LGBT advocacy seeking nonmarital rights and recognition for
families formed by gays and lesbians. Litigation for same-sex
marriage emerged in the U.S. in the 1970s, but was met with
uniform rejection.76 The modern marriage equality movement

75.

See Douglas NeJaime, Differentiating Assimilation, STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS,
2018) (draft on file with author).
76. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).

AND SOCIETY (forthcoming
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traces its origins to litigation in Hawaii in the early 1990s,77
following a period of LGBT advocacy focused on nonmarital
recognition. For many years after the Hawaii litigation, marriage
claims moved forward primarily at the state level, under state
constitutional law.78 It was not until the late 2000s that federal
courts became important actors in same-sex marriage litigation.79
Eventually, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court, with decisions in
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry,80 intervened in the marriage
fight. In Windsor, the Court opened the way to federal recognition
of same-sex couples’ marriages,81 and in Hollingsworth, it let stand
a federal district court ruling extending marriage to same-sex
couples in California.82 In the wake of these decisions, federal
courts, one after another, struck down state bans on same-sex
marriage, leading ultimately to the Court’s recognition of samesex couples’ nationwide right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges in
2015.83 Windsor and Obergefell, and the federal decisions between
them, were framed around constitutional principles of equality
and liberty. After all, it was a claim to marriage—a fundamental
right—and equality—a constitutional guarantee—that was being
adjudicated.
This focus on the constitutional norms animating the
marriage claim locates marriage equality within a trajectory of
decisions protecting the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians.
Indeed, the Obergefell Court invoked not only the Supreme
Court’s equal protection reasoning in Windsor, but also its earlier
decisions in Romer v. Evans,84 which struck down Colorado’s
Amendment 2, and Lawrence,85 which struck down Texas’s
“homosexual conduct” law. The Court framed the question of
same-sex marriage as emerging out of these constitutional
developments on the rights of gays and lesbians. After addressing

77. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
78. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1248–50 (2010).
79. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has
Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 281–82 (2013).
80. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013).
81. 133 S. Ct. 2675.
82. 133 S. Ct. 2652.
83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
84. Romer v. Evans, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the trajectory from Bowers v. Hardwick,86 which rejected a
constitutional challenge to anti-sodomy laws, to Romer and
Lawrence, the Court declared: “Against this background, the
legal question of same-sex marriage arose.”87
The constitutional focus also situates the marriage claim
within a line of precedents on the constitutional status of
marriage. The Obergefell Court turned to cases outside the LGBT
context, from Griswold and Loving to Zablocki and Turner, to
buttress its reasoning about same-sex marriage.88 Marriage
equality, in other words, became part of an important
constitutional tradition.
This constitutional framing of the marriage claim obscures
the role of family law. Indeed, nowhere did the Obergefell Court
discuss the history of domestic partnership and the municipal
fights over the recognition of same-sex relationships beginning in
the 1980s. Yet, as we have seen, the claims to marriage followed
from years of LGBT advocacy seeking equal treatment for the
families formed by lesbians and gay men. Perhaps because earlier
family law work did not generally speak in the register of
fundamental rights or equal protection, there has been little
attempt to connect it explicitly to subsequent claims to marriage
equality.89 In fact, to the extent scholars have related the two, the
tendency has been to see them as motivated by different concerns,
pushing different goals, and ultimately moving in different
directions. Through this lens, LGBT family law work over the past
several decades was driven by objectives traditionally rooted in
family law—such as the welfare of children and support for
diverse family arrangements. Marriage equality, on the other
hand, has been seen as prioritizing formal equality and civil rights
over family law efforts to support a range of dependency
relationships.90 This perspective tends to affirm the impulse to
place the marriage equality claim outside the trajectory of family
law work occurring at the state level.91

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
Id. at 2598–99.
See Joslin, supra note 32, at 199.
For leading accounts, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE (2008); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012).
91. See NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 34, at 165.
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The claim to equal recognition of the families formed by
same-sex couples—a claim articulated eventually through
marriage equality advocacy—was forged in the domain of family
law before marriage occupied its central role in LGBT advocacy
and in the space outside of formal marriage. That earlier work
spoke the language of family law but did so in ways that reflected
constitutional norms of equality and liberty. And it constructed a
model of family—including both marriage and parenthood—that
ultimately supported the constitutional claim to marriage
equality. This is not to say that LGBT work in family law
deliberately set up claims to marriage; indeed, marriage was not a
priority for advocates working in family law in the 1980s and early
1990s, and many of these advocates supported a family diversity
agenda that decentered marriage.92 Yet, as I have shown in other
work, even those advocates contesting the centrality of marriage
found that marriage anchored their efforts; simply to achieve
nonmarital rights, they often cast same-sex couples in marriagelike terms to persuade both government actors and potential
allies.93 As the discussion that follows shows, once marriage claims
proliferated, earlier family law work—including work animated
by the drive to make marriage less important—shaped both the
framing of marriage claims and the terms on which marriage
claims were contested.94
B. MARRIAGE EQUALITY’S FAMILY LAW ROOTS
The fight over marriage equality recapitulated battles waged
on the terrain of family law. Commentators have largely failed to
notice this dynamic, continuing to view family law outside the lens
of national, constitutional, civil rights law. When we put family
law into focus, we see that decisions on marriage equality
culminating with Obergefell were expressed in the register of
constitutional law, yet held within them family law insights
produced by many years of LGBT advocacy. Again,
understandings of both the adult relationship and the parent-child
relationship illustrate this dynamic. These understandings should

92. See id. at 104–12.
93. See id. at 161–62.
94. Of course, the LGBT movement was hardly the first to shape the meaning of
marriage. Both civil rights advocates and feminist activists contributed to new
understandings of marriage.
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orient marriage equality to claims of family rights and recognition
arising today.
Key elements of nonmarital relationship recognition are
observable in subsequent approaches to marriage claims—with
respect both to how courts conceptualized marriage and to
whether they viewed same-sex couples as similarly situated to
different-sex couples for purposes of marriage.95 Consider the
federal district court’s opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the
challenge to California’s Proposition 8. Determining that
California’s ban on same-sex marriage violated federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, the
court declared:
Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple’s
choice to live with each other, to remain committed to one
another and to form a household based on their own feelings
about one another and to join in an economic partnership and
support one another and any dependents.96

The court’s language mirrored the attributes of domestic
partnership from its origins in Berkeley and San Francisco.
The district court’s decision became the governing decision
in the case, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hollingsworth. But
before that, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on
narrower grounds. In doing so, it articulated the attributes of
marriage in terms that reflected meanings forged in battles for
domestic partnership. “[B]ecause we acknowledge the financial
interdependence of those who have entered into an ‘enduring’
relationship,” the court explained, “[w]e allow spouses but not
siblings or roommates to file taxes jointly.”97 For the Perry courts,
intimate adult commitment and emotional and economic
interdependence—not gender differentiation and procreation—
defined marriage, just as those concepts had defined domestic
partnership.98
95. See id. at 165–71.
96. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
97. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
98. For a similar framing by LGBT advocates themselves, see Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Motions to
Dismiss of Defendants Christopher Rich and State of Idaho, at 6, Latta v. Otter (D. Id.
2014) (“The legal institution of marriage under Idaho law is a contractual relationship
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The focus on intimate adult affiliation and mutual emotional
and financial support is also evident in Obergefell. There the
Court described marriage as an “enduring bond, [in which] two
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression,
intimacy, and spirituality.”99 In explaining why marriage is
fundamental for constitutional purposes, the Court first focused
on adult partnership, declaring that “the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any
other in its importance to the committed individuals.”100
The Obergefell Court emphasized not only the emotional but
material dimensions of marriage—underscoring marriage’s
distributive function. Marriage, the Court recognized, is “the basis
for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and
responsibilities.”101 Domestic partnership efforts, which sought to
extend benefits like health insurance coverage to same-sex
couples excluded from marriage, underwrote this model of
marital recognition. Advocates established the relevance of
material benefits to the lives of same-sex couples not only in
marriage work that began in the early 1990s but also in work on
behalf of unmarried same-sex couples that began in the early
1980s. As the domestic partnership regime had clearly evidenced,
same-sex couples needed and wanted the material rights and
benefits attached to marriage just as much as their different-sex
counterparts. As the Obergefell Court concluded: “There is no
difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect
to this principle.”102 While the Court mustered constitutional
precedents, like Griswold, Loving, and Turner, to support its
assertions about marriage’s tangible and intangible attributes, the
understanding of marriage that emerges from Obergefell also
reflects years of LGBT advocacy on behalf of nonmarital
recognition.
From the Court’s perspective, marriage is not primarily
defined by procreation and childrearing. In fact, the Court made
clear that the right to marry is no “less meaningful for those who
do not or cannot have children. An ability, desire, or promise to
embodying a couple’s desire to commit themselves publicly to one another, and to
undertake legal duties to care for and protect each other and any children they may have,
as they move through life together as a family.”).
99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2601.
102. Id.
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procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.”103 Strikingly, though, the constitutional case for
marriage focused on children even as it distanced marriage from
procreation. This too reflected developments pushed by earlier
LGBT advocacy in family law. Parenting efforts simultaneously
supported both adult-centered and child-centered approaches to
the constitutional claim to marriage. The recognition of lesbian
and gay parents outside of marriage discredited justifications for
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage at the same time
that it rendered same-sex couples suitable subjects for a childcentered model of marriage.
On one hand, the marriage claim leveraged the separation of
marriage and parenting, as well as the vindication of nonmarital
parenting, in earlier family law work. In California, as the Perry
district court concluded, defending a marriage ban based on
childrearing seemed irrational when the state “treated same-sex
parents identically to opposite-sex parents.”104 More broadly, the
state’s embrace of lesbian and gay parenting constituted part of a
broader trend loosening marriage’s grip on parenting. As the
Ninth Circuit explained, California’s “laws governing parenting
. . . are distinct from its laws governing marriage.”105 The robust
recognition of nonmarital parenting, advanced by LGBT
advocates, made child-based justifications for restrictive marriage
laws appear illogical. Parenting did not depend on marriage, and,
as the Obergefell Court reasoned, marriage did not depend on
parenting.106
On the other hand—and somewhat paradoxically—earlier
work on behalf of unmarried same-sex parents contributed to
evolving understandings of parenthood, including marital
parenthood, that supported same-sex couples’ inclusion in
marriage.107 Opponents of same-sex marriage argued that
marriage should promote “optimal childrearing,” in which

103. Id.
104. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
105. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
106. 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
107. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1236–
40.
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mothers and fathers raise their biological children together.108
This view of marriage prioritizes procreative sex and dual-gender
childrearing—attributes that do not align with the families formed
by same-sex couples. In response, LGBT advocates did not simply
reject the importance of childrearing to marriage, but instead
advanced an understanding of parenting—one forged in earlier
family law conflicts—in which same-sex and different-sex couples
are similarly situated. Same-sex couples, like different-sex
couples, deliberately form families in which they decide to have
and raise children.109 This, advocates argued, is an approach to
parenthood embedded in contemporary understandings of
marriage.
Courts found this logic persuasive. Consider again the
reasoning of the federal district court that struck down
California’s Proposition 8. “California law,” the court explained,
“permits and encourages gays and lesbians to become parents
through adoption . . . or assistive reproductive technology.”110
Even more explicitly, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, “in
California, the parentage statutes place a premium on the ‘social
relationship,’ not the ‘biological relationship,’ between a parent
and a child.”111 Intentional and functional principles of
parenthood—principles elaborated through earlier LGBT
advocacy on behalf of unmarried lesbian and gay parents—
furnished the logic for a view of parenthood that spanned both
marital and nonmarital families and included both same-sex and
different-sex couples.
The connection between same-sex parenting and marital
parenting also appears in Obergefell, not merely in the Court’s
description of the petitioners but also in its constitutional
reasoning. Even as the Court explained that marriage is
fundamental because it “supports a two-person union,” the Court
acknowledged that marriage’s fundamental character relates in
108. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Robert P. George et al. in Support of
Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. Addressing the Merits and Supporting
Reversal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307), 2013 WL
390984.
109. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1237.
110. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
111. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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part to its role in “safeguard[ing] children and families.”112
Marriage, the Court explained, “affords the permanency and
stability important to children’s best interests.”113 Indeed, in an
implicit nod to family law reform, the Court acknowledged that
“[m]ost states have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as
individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children
have same-sex parents.”114 Endorsing an approach to marital
parenthood that turns on neither biology nor gender, the Court
viewed same-sex and different-sex couples as similarly situated.115
Ultimately, the model of marital parenthood advanced by the
marriage equality claim looks much like the model of social
parenthood that gradually accommodated lesbian and gay parents
outside of marriage.
III. CONSTITUTING PARENTHOOD
As this Part shows, just as family law developments
reverberated in constitutional reasoning about marriage equality,
the constitutional acceptance of marriage equality reverberates,
for better and for worse, in a new generation of family law
conflicts.116 The discussion that follows illustrates this dynamic by
drawing on developments in the law of parental recognition in
marriage equality’s wake. Contemplating future implications of
the mutually constitutive relationship between family law and
constitutional law, this Part then imagines how family law reform
of parental recognition may one day reshape constitutional
approaches to parenthood.

112. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 2599 (explaining that “the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples”).
116. I focus here on liberalization in the law of parental recognition, but the
constitutionalization of marriage equality may also serve as a regressive force in family
law, with respect to not only parental recognition but also adult relationship recognition.
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781 (Ill. 2016) (relying on Obergefell in denying
marriage-like rights to unmarried same-sex couple that dissolved their relationship after
more than two decades). For the leading scholarly treatment of this dynamic, see Melissa
Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207
(2016). For a powerful argument that Obergefell may open constitutional paths to
nonmarital rights, see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to
Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425 (2017).
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A. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND PARENTAL RECOGNITION
The model of family that justifies same-sex couples’ inclusion
in marriage is one that marginalizes gender differentiation and
biological procreation and instead embraces chosen and
functional families. Now, with same-sex marriage, we are seeing a
more wide-scale incorporation of a model of parenting based on
conduct and intent—over a biological, gender-differentiated
model of parenting.117
In earlier nonmarital parenting work, LGBT advocates
seized on marriage’s capacity to accommodate nonbiological
parenthood. Today, advocates leverage marriage equality in ways
that push law to more thoroughly accommodate social,
nonbiological relationships. Donor-insemination statutes that
recognize the husband as the legal father can similarly treat a
woman’s wife as the “natural,” and thus “legal,” parent.118 And
courts have increasingly applied the marital presumption—long
capable of recognizing husbands as fathers even in the face of
contrary biological evidence119—to lesbian couples.120 The
parentage statutes, a New York court explained, must be
interpreted in a “gender-neutral” manner in light of the onset of
marriage equality, such that “the child of either partner in a
married same-sex couple will be presumed to be the child of both,
even though the child is not genetically linked to both parents.”121
While the marital presumption always could conceal
biological truth, the extent to which it did was often deliberately
obscured.122 Applying the marital presumption to same-sex
couples detaches the presumption from biological parenthood in

117. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1241–
49.
118. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2295
(2017). Clearly, same-sex parenting is connected to assisted reproductive technologies
(ART), and both relate to shifting approaches to parenthood. In other work, I explore how
legal regulation of ART exposes tensions between, on one hand, biological and gendered
conceptions of parentage and, on the other hand, intentional and functional conceptions
of parentage. I link the expansion of intentional and functional approaches to sexual
orientation and gender equality. See generally id.
119. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
120. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2295.
121. Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S. 2d 845, 860–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). See
also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013); Della Corte v.
Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
122. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2277.
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more obvious, deliberate, and transparent ways.123 As Susan
Appleton argues, the presumption’s application to same-sex
couples “highlights the way this long-established doctrine can
construct a legal reality even in the face of conflicting biological
facts.”124 Now, the presumption rests on the horizontal
relationship between the partners and their mutual agreement
regarding the parental role vis-à-vis the child.125 The same idea
that, in large part, supported the recognition of lesbian and gay
parents in nonmarital families furnishes the logic through which
to understand the key provision attaching parental rights inside
the marital family. The marital presumption begins to collapse
with the intent-based principles applied to married and unmarried
parents and the nonbiological reading of the conduct-based
“holding out” presumption applied to unmarried parents. The
marital presumption, in other words, makes sense because it
provides an indication of intent and conduct.
To be meaningful, the marital presumption for lesbian
couples must be protected against rebuttal by genetic evidence.
The presumption, in other words, must fully own its lack of
signification of biological connection. Applied equally in the
same-sex and different-sex contexts, this development would
render the presumption a more thoroughly social concept across
different-sex and same-sex couples.126 Indeed, it would cut directly
against more recent trends toward the use of genetic evidence to
disestablish a man’s paternity when he discovers that another man
is the biological father of his wife’s child.127

123. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1242
(“With same-sex marriage, the presumption makes sense only because it provides an
indication of intent and ‘holding out[.]’”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women:
Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV.
227, 230 (2006) (“As applied to same-sex couples, of course, the presumption [of
legitimacy] and its variants always diverge from genetic parentage and always produce
what might be considered fictional or socially constructed results.”).
124. Appleton, supra note 123, at 230.
125. See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status
for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 718 (2012).
126. Appleton, supra note 123, at 291 (“If the law permits rebuttal by genetic
evidence, then applying the same principles to lesbian couples provides them and their
children precious little. On the other hand, if this approach leads to the conclusion that
genetic evidence is irrelevant to the parentage of lesbian couples, then the ‘parity goal’
indicates that the same principles should apply to traditional couples, making genetic
evidence irrelevant to them as well.”).
127. Id. at 237.
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While motherhood continues to represent the primary
parent-child relationship, fatherhood is conceptualized as
derivative of the mother’s relationship.128 Essentially, the husband
is the father because he is married to the mother. In this sense,
men’s relationships appear more dependent on social
relationships yet remain secondary, while women’s relationships
retain primacy but are rooted more fully in biology.129 Yet in an
age of marriage equality, the policies animating the marital
presumption—to identify the parents who intend to have and
support the child—appear to apply to both women and men.130
Accordingly, the presumption could apply regardless of sex,
leading not only to recognition of a biological mother’s husband
or wife but also to recognition of a biological father’s husband or
wife—an argument I develop in other work.131
Of course, many of these changes do not depend on the
constitutional resolution of same-sex marriage. What, then, does
constitutional law add? The constitutional recognition of samesex couples’ right to marry, on both due process and equal
protection grounds, provides powerful new arguments for
parental recognition in resistant jurisdictions. Obergefell does not
settle the conflict over same-sex marriage but instead channels it
in new directions.132 Parentage features prominently in postObergefell disputes over the consequences of marriage equality.133
In today’s parentage disputes, the marriage equality precedent
can be understood in relation to the family law developments that
gave rise to it. Marriage equality decisions credited claims to
parental recognition originating decades earlier as a family law
matter. Appreciating this can lead courts and legislatures to see
parenthood as critical to Obergefell’s endorsement of the equal
status of same-sex couples’ families.

128. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. REV. 637, 644 (1993) (“fatherhood can only be presumed through a man’s
relation to the child’s mother”).
129. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2314–15, 2328–29.
130. Id. at 2340.
131. See id. at 2339–43.
132. See Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
133. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, 1243–
44.
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Consider the federal district court’s decision in Henderson v.
Adams.134 Even with marriage for same-sex couples, Indiana had
not altered gender-specific terms in its parentage provisions.
Moreover, its parentage law, unlike the UPA, does not expressly
direct that provisions applicable to the father-child relationship
apply to the mother-child relationship. The relevant paternity
statute provides: “A man is presumed to be a child’s biological
father if . . . the . . . man and the child’s biological mother are or
have been married to each other.”135 Even though the statute
refers to the “biological father,” the state had for years allowed a
married woman who gave birth to a child conceived with donor
sperm to list her husband on the child’s birth certificate. In
refusing to provide the same treatment to the wife of a woman
who gives birth to a child conceived with donor sperm, the state
required the nonbiological mother to adopt the child to become a
legal parent.
Indiana defended its position by citing “an important
governmental interest in preserving the rights of biological fathers
and recording and maintaining accurate records regarding the
biological parentage of children born in Indiana.”136 The state
attempted to cabin Obergefell, asserting that the decision
“actually decoupled marriage from parenthood because the right
to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to
procreate.”137 But the Indiana federal district court instead
concluded that Obergefell had consequences for the law of
parental recognition. Indiana had “created a benefit for married
women based on their marriage to a man, which allows them to
name their husband on their child’s birth certificate even when
the husband is not the biological father.”138 “Because of . . .
Obergefell,” the court concluded, “this benefit—which is directly
tied to marriage—must now be afforded to women married to
women.”139 The parentage statutes, the court determined,
unconstitutionally discriminate based on sex and sexual

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
IND. CODE § 31-14-7-1 (2016).
Henderson, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id.
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orientation.140 Obergefell provided the constitutional basis on
which to require a resistant state to extend parental recognition
to married lesbian couples who used donor insemination.141
Indeed, just as this essay went to print, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that Obergefell requires states to treat samesex couples like different-sex couples with respect to birth
certificates. (Birth certificates do not establish parentage, but are
evidence of parentage.) In a per curiam order, the Court reversed
an Arkansas Supreme Court decision that allowed the state to
refuse to issue birth certificates listing the female spouse of a
woman who gives birth, even though the state lists the male
spouse of a woman who gives birth.142 “Obergefell,” the Court
declared, “proscribes such disparate treatment.”143 The Court’s
decision will likely have immediate and significant consequences
for the conflicts over parental recognition that have proliferated
in Obergefell’s wake.
B. PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE?
Like the Henderson court, other courts have found that the
government’s refusal to extend marital parentage presumptions
to same-sex couples violates the guarantee of equality announced
in Obergefell.144 In contrast to these decisions, though, the
Henderson court ruled not only on equal protection but also on
due process grounds. And its due process reasoning was rooted
not in the right to marry, but instead in parental rights. The court
concluded that the Indiana parentage statutes interfere with
same-sex couples’ “exercise of the right to be a parent by denying
them any opportunity for a presumption of parenthood which is
offered to heterosexual couples.”145 To the extent this cursory
reasoning can be read to protect the nonbiological parent as a
matter of constitutional doctrine, it is exceptional. Parenthood’s

140. Id. Months later, the court issued an order affirming but clarifying its earlier
decision. See Henderson v. Adams, Case No. 1:15-cv-00220-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 7492478
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2016).
141. Indiana appealed the district court’s decision. See Brief and Required Short
Appendix of Appellant Dr. Jerome Adams, Henderson v. Adams, Case No. 17-1141 (7th
Cir. 2017).
142. Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. __ (2017).
143. Id. (slip op. at 3).
144. See Roe v. Patton, Case No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734 (D. Utah July
22, 2015).
145. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
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constitutional status has generally been limited to biological
parent-child relationships. Henderson, then, suggests that the loop
between family law and constitutional law might continue in the
doctrinal space of parenthood. The elaboration of nonbiological
parenthood in the domain of family law, including through shifts
generated by marriage equality, might contribute to new
understandings of parenthood as a constitutional matter.146
While constitutional precedents on parental rights date back
to the 1920s,147 the Court’s more extensive articulation of
constitutional protection for parenthood began in the 1970s with
cases on the rights of unmarried fathers.148 Even as the Court
expanded the parameters of parenthood as a constitutional
matter, it did so on an understanding that constitutional interests
arose out of “natural” parent-child bonds.149 While this biological
premise is at times simply taken for granted, often the Court has
been explicit about the relationship between biological
parenthood and constitutional rights.150 (Of course, once an
individual becomes a legal parent under state law—through
adoption, for instance—that individual possesses constitutionally
protected parental rights. But the relevant constitutional cases
primarily concern the rights of individuals who have not been
adjudicated parents under state law.)
Many developments could have provoked successful
challenges to the biological grounding of constitutional
parenthood. For instance, claims by foster parents contesting the
termination of their foster placements posed questions relating to
the constitutional interests of nonbiological parent-child
relationships.151 But the Court resisted, affirming the importance
of protecting “natural” parent-child bonds and leaving unsettled
146. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2357–59. There is a danger, of course, that
nonbiological parenthood attains constitutional status only when tied to marriage.
147. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
148. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
149. See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Lehr, 463 U.S. 248; Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380
(1979).
150. It is worth noting that in Prince v. Massachusetts, a 1944 case involving parental
rights, the Court simply assumed that the litigant, who had her own children but was also
the legal guardian of her niece, could claim parental authority over that niece. 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
151. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
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when, if ever, foster parents might have a constitutional liberty
interest in the relationships with their foster children.152
In contrast to constitutional doctrine, family law, over the
past several years, has moved away from an understanding of
parenthood limited to biological connection.153 State family law
regimes regularly recognize parents who form nonbiological
parent-child bonds without requiring those parents to adopt their
children. Indeed, those bonds at times trump competing claims by
biological parents.
In some states, the term “natural”—generally used in
constitutional discourse to describe biological parents154—has
shifted. As Nicholas H. demonstrates, state courts began to
interpret the UPA’s “holding out” provision—which turned on
holding the child out as one’s “natural” child—to recognize a man
as a father even when he was not biologically related to the
child.155 Indeed, some courts did so over the objection of the
biological father asserting paternity.156 In other words, biology
was no longer viewed as the determinant of nonmarital
fatherhood, and instead parental conduct was deemed more
critical.157 In the name of functional parenthood, “natural” came
to mean “legal,” rather than “biological.” By the 2000s, some state
appellate courts began to apply the “holding out” presumption of
paternity to women. Recall the California Supreme Court’s 2005
decision in Elisa B. v. Superior Court,158 which found a

152. See id. at 846–47. Again, adoptive parents enjoy constitutionally protected
parental rights, but those parents have engaged in formal legal proceedings adjudicating
their rights. So, for instance, a stepfather does not attain constitutionally protected
parental rights unless and until he adopts the child and thereby supplants the biological
father. The Court has not articulated a constitutional parenthood doctrine that expressly
includes nonbiological parents who are not adoptive parents.
153. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34.
154. See, e.g., Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (distinguishing the “foster family” from the
“natural family”).
155. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002), as modified (July 17, 2002).
156. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
157. Of course, adoption has long offered a route to nonbiological parenthood. But
adoption creates a legal relationship after termination of the biological parents’ rights, and
adoption continues to be viewed as an exception to normal operation of parentage rules.
Here I am dealing with presumptions of parentage that apply regardless of biological
connection and even when the biological parent is fit and objects to the competing
parentage claim.
158. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). See also Chaterjee v. King,
280 P.3d 283, 285 n.3 (N.M. 2012).
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nonbiological mother to be a parent by virtue of the “holding out”
presumption.
In disputes involving same-sex parents, advocates argued for
the recognition of nonbiological parents not only on family law
grounds but also on constitutional grounds. They claimed that
statutory and common-law parentage principles should lead to
parental recognition, but, to the extent those principles did not
yield recognition, the court should deem their application
unconstitutional.159 Most of these constitutional claims were never
resolved. Instead, courts recognizing the nonbiological lesbian coparent did so on statutory or common-law grounds.160 In some
cases, though, courts reached the constitutional questions. Some
courts accepted constitutional arguments, reasoning that equal
protection required the extension of paternity presumptions to
same-sex couples.161 Other courts rejected constitutional claims,
including claims that the nonbiological mother possessed parental
rights as a matter of due process.162 Still, the number of cases
resolving the constitutional status of the nonbiological mother’s
parental rights remains relatively small.
With newfound constitutional support for the families
formed by same-sex couples, constitutional claims of
nonbiological parents may proliferate. Indeed, not only women
but men in same-sex couples may assert such claims.163 Given that
same-sex couples ordinarily include a parent without a biological
connection to the child, the constitutional recognition of
nonbiological parents is critical to the equal standing of families
formed by same-sex couples. The claim to constitutional
protection for parental rights appears, just as marriage had been,
bound up in the equality of same-sex couples.164 With shifts in
both family law and constitutional law on the status of gays and
lesbians, federal courts—guided by Obergefell’s dialogic approach

159. See supra notes 70-71.
160. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660.
161. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Public Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013)
(ruling on state constitutional grounds); Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. App. 2009)
(ruling on state constitutional grounds).
162. See, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, No. 2D14-5540, 2015 WL 5947198, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Oct. 14, 2015).
163. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2358–59.
164. See id.
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to liberty and equality—might ultimately recognize nonbiological
parents as a matter of constitutional due process.165
CONCLUSION—REFLECTIONS ON (FAMILY) LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE
Missing the continuity between earlier family law work and
more recent constitutional conflict over same-sex marriage has
costs. Scholars, lawyers, and judges may underestimate the impact
of family law and overestimate the impact of constitutional law.
They may obscure family law’s role as a critical site for equality
work and elide the influence of family law developments on
constitutional understandings of the family. They may expect too
much from constitutional law and give undue weight to
constitutional resolution.
Better understanding the role that family law plays in
subsequent constitutional adjudication might influence a range of
academic debates. Consider just one example. Theories of law
and social change often focus on federal actors (including
primarily federal courts) and federal law (including primarily
federal constitutional law).166 Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court
decisions articulating federal constitutional principles remain the
primary subjects of analysis.167 Cases like Brown v. Board of
Education168 and Roe v. Wade, for instance, feature prominently
in debates about when, whether, and how courts should intervene
with respect to controversial questions.169 Of course, given that
same-sex marriage was first expressed as a constitutional matter
under state law, critiques of judicial intervention (and litigation

165. In future work, I plan to fully explore the relationship between constitutional
parental rights and nonbiological parent-child relationships.
166. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
167. Consider work on the backlash thesis, which suggests that favorable court
decisions on questions subject to society-wide debate set a movement back by inspiring
powerful countermobilization. This work focuses largely on U.S. Supreme Court decisions
with respect to contested questions of constitutional law. See ROSENBERG, supra note 166;
Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM.
HIST. 81 (1994).
168. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
169. Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 166, with Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
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strategies aimed at such intervention) regularly target state
constitutional decisions.170
Critics of judicial intervention tend to approach court
decisions in a fairly top-down way—as deciding contested issues
in ways that may either settle conflict or squelch democratic
deliberation and thereby inflame resistance.171 Some scholars
have responded to these critiques by adopting a more bottom-up
perspective that views constitutional decisions as growing out of
popular mobilization and as reshaping conflict that continues long
after the decision.172 Attention to the family law antecedents of
constitutional decisions could productively contribute to this
bottom-up account.
One might view judicial resolution of a question like samesex marriage in light of developments in family law relating to the
nonmarital recognition of same-sex-couple-headed families. One
might consider how a separate body of law, contested at an earlier
moment and in different venues and levels of government, shaped
the stakes of subsequent constitutional debate.173 One might
analyze the ultimate constitutional adjudication and its impact
along a longer time horizon and as entangled with a broader
constellation of issues.
One might also view federal courts and federal constitutional
law as less significant. Courts recognizing same-sex couples’ right
to marry may not have boldly staked out new territory. Instead,
they might have merely continued trends that began in family law.
Family law reform that primarily involved unmarried gays and
170. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign To Win
the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643 (2009); Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. REV. 431 (2005).
171. See Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877, 879-80 (2013); Douglas NeJaime, The View From Below: Public Interest
Lawyering, Social Change, and Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 182, 193 (2013).
172. For examples of relevant sociolegal work, see Douglas NeJaime, Winning
Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash:
Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151
(2009); Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES
LAW MATTER? 76, 85 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). For examples of
relevant legal scholarship, see Post & Siegel, supra note 169; Lani Guinier, The Supreme
Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2008); Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135 (2007); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of
the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
173. See DAVID D. COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS
TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227 (2015).
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lesbians and nonmarital rights and recognition shaped the terms
of debate in subsequent marriage litigation. Federal courts
accepting marriage equality claims did so after a series of
developments, largely in state family law, that both called into
question justifications for excluding same-sex couples from
marriage and constituted marriage in ways that could
accommodate the families of same-sex couples. From this
perspective, power resides less in the domains of constitutional
doctrine and federal adjudication and more in the spaces—
statutory,
judicial,
and
administrative—conventionally
understood as family law.

